A shareholder in Eastman Kodak Co. has filed a significant objection to the company's chapter 11 reorganization plan, which provides for the effective elimination of the company's stock. Shareholder Matthew Glassman argues that equity holders need representation in the case and that the reorganization plan “is a blatant attempt to rob both the shareholders and unsecured debt and bond holders of money and shares that are rightfully theirs.” Kodak is also facing challenges by retirees, and the bankruptcy court has set a hearing for June 20, 2013, to consider creating an official committee of retirees in connection with unfunded retirement programs Kodak eliminated when it filed for bankruptcy. Read more here.
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Jefferson County Bondholders May Face Losses
Jefferson County, Alabama, announced yesterday that it will file a chapter 9 reprganization plan by late June, 2013, to exit bankruptcy. Jefferson County may become the first large local government since the 1930's to impose losses upon its bondholders. Read more here.
CFPB Recommends More Flexible Approach to Private Student Loan Debt
Yesterday, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) proposed to create more flexible repayment plans for private student loans. These loans are $150 billion of the current $1 trillion in outstanding student loan debt. The CFPB proposes that borrowers who pay on time should be allowed to refinance at lower interest rates, whereas borrowers who default should be provided with income-based repayment plans. The CFPB urges lenders to implement those recommendations now. The CFPB also proposed that a rehabilitation program available for federal student loan debt be extended to private loans. Read more here.
Changing the Light at the End of the Tunnel: Distressed Financing Roundtable
Check out this article I wrote for the Bulletin, the newspaper for the Bar Association of San Francisco, all about a roundtable of distressed lending professionals I hosted as chair of the Commercial Law and Bankruptcy Section. You can see the video here. - Reno Fernandez
“Me First!” California Appellate Court Rules Two Liens Recorded Simultaneously Have Equal Priority
In First Bank v. East West Bank, 2011 Westlaw 4908756 (Cal.App.), California’s Second District Court of Appeal ruled that two deeds of trust against real property marked “recorded” at exactly the same moment have equal priority, notwithstanding the fact that one was indexed first.
This case arises from a scam in which the borrower, Kyung Ha Chung, obtained two loans from two different banks on the same day, without telling the other what he was doing. Each bank believed it would be in first position. Both banks waited about a week to record their deeds of trust, which were delivered to the recorder’s office on the same day before business hours. When the recorder’s office opened at 8:00 am, both deeds of trust were marked “recorded” as of 8:00 am, although they were indexed approximately 4 hours apart. First Bank’s lien was indexed second, and East West Bank sued for declaratory relief. In the meantime, Chung absconded with the money.
In holding that the liens share equal priority, the court explained that neither lien was the “first duly recorded” pursuant to the recording statute. East West Bank argued that the time of indexing should be used as a “tiebreaker,” but the court found that the statute provides for recording and indexing as separate duties of the recorder, with recording establishing priority, not indexing.
The court’s ruling may be technically incorrect. Specifically, Chung could not have executed both deeds of trust simultaneously (in fact, he probably attended two separate signings). The deed of trust executed earlier in time would prevail under common law, and the recording statute would not invalidate the lien because neither bank was the first to record.
This case provides two practical warnings: First, record as soon as possible. It is not clear why the banks both waited about a week to record, but either one could have avoided losing priority by recording promptly. Second, when multiple deeds of trust are to be executed simultaneously, be sure to provide proper recording instructions.
(Also seen on Insight Into Banking)
This case arises from a scam in which the borrower, Kyung Ha Chung, obtained two loans from two different banks on the same day, without telling the other what he was doing. Each bank believed it would be in first position. Both banks waited about a week to record their deeds of trust, which were delivered to the recorder’s office on the same day before business hours. When the recorder’s office opened at 8:00 am, both deeds of trust were marked “recorded” as of 8:00 am, although they were indexed approximately 4 hours apart. First Bank’s lien was indexed second, and East West Bank sued for declaratory relief. In the meantime, Chung absconded with the money.
In holding that the liens share equal priority, the court explained that neither lien was the “first duly recorded” pursuant to the recording statute. East West Bank argued that the time of indexing should be used as a “tiebreaker,” but the court found that the statute provides for recording and indexing as separate duties of the recorder, with recording establishing priority, not indexing.
The court’s ruling may be technically incorrect. Specifically, Chung could not have executed both deeds of trust simultaneously (in fact, he probably attended two separate signings). The deed of trust executed earlier in time would prevail under common law, and the recording statute would not invalidate the lien because neither bank was the first to record.
This case provides two practical warnings: First, record as soon as possible. It is not clear why the banks both waited about a week to record, but either one could have avoided losing priority by recording promptly. Second, when multiple deeds of trust are to be executed simultaneously, be sure to provide proper recording instructions.
(Also seen on Insight Into Banking)
Be Careful What You Wish For: Automatic Acceleration Upon Bankruptcy Prevented Collection of Prepayment Premium
A Mississippi bankruptcy court has ruled that when a promissory note provides for automatic acceleration triggered by the borrower’s bankruptcy, under New York law oversecured noteholders cannot collect a prepayment premium. In re Premier Entertainment Biloxi, LLC, 445 B.R. 582 (Bankr. S.D.Miss. 2010). The ruling had significant financial consequences for the lenders, and although the impact of the case is unclear, lenders and investment bankers should take steps to avoid a similar result in future transactions.
In 2002, Premier Entertainment Biloxi, LLC and certain related entities undertook to construct the Hard Rock Hotel & Casino Biloxi, the plans for which included a 112-foot guitar sign. To finance construction, the Debtors issued 10.75% first mortgage notes in the principal amount of $160 Million, due on February 1, 2012, with $8.6 Million in interest due February 1 and August 1 each year beginning on August 1, 2004. U.S. Bank served as indenture trustee.
The notes provided for automatic acceleration of the maturity date upon the Debtors’ filing of a voluntary bankruptcy petition. The notes also provided that the Debtors could redeem the notes prior to maturity, but not before the end of the “no-call period” on February 1, 2008, by paying the principal plus a prepayment premium (100% to 105.375% depending on the remaining term). If the Debtors were to take any willful action during the no-call period with the intent of avoiding the prohibition on early redemption, the lenders would be entitled to higher prepayment premiums (106.719% to 110.75% depending on the remaining term).
The hotel and casino were completed on time and a certificate of occupancy as issued on August 26, 2005. Three days later, on August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina completely destroyed the resort’s casino, which was built upon two floating barges, and severely damaged other facilities. Thereafter, the Debtors negotiated with the indenture trustee and other parties to reconstruct the resort, this time on concrete piers, using remaining cash and insurance proceeds. However, the lenders eventually lost faith in the project and stopped all construction disbursements.
On January 6, 2006, the indenture trustee gave notice of certain defaults, which did not trigger automatic acceleration. Subsequently, a controlling stake in the Debtors was purchased by a new equity group, which made several offers to purchase the notes up to 101% of principal, far below the 105.375% required as of the expiration of the no-call period. At the time, the market price of the notes ranged from 105% to 106%.
The indenture trustee rejected the offers, and the Debtors commenced chapter 11 cases on September 19, 2006. The Debtors filed a reorganization plan providing for payment of the notes at par value plus accrued interest from new financing. Although the noteholders rejected the plan, all other classes of creditors voted in favor of the plan and it was “crammed down” over the noteholders’ objections. The plan was confirmed in June, 2007, and the resort opened to much fanfare just a few days later.
Thereafter, a trial was held on the noteholders’ entitlement to the contractual prepayment premiums that were denied under the plan. The bankruptcy court ruled in favor of the Debtors, holding that: “The reason [automatic acceleration] clauses exist is to allow lenders to accelerate the debt without first having to petition the bankruptcy court to lift the automatic stay.” In exchange for this advantage, the court held that the noteholders gave up their expectation of a prepayment premium: “The [noteholders] chose to forego any prepayment premium in favor of an immediate right to collect their entire debt after a bankruptcy event of default.”
The court’s rationale is dubious in that it is unlikely the noteholders actually preferred to exchange the significant economic benefits of the prepayment premium for the relatively minor procedural advantage of avoiding a motion for relief from the automatic stay. Moreover, there is authority questioning whether an automatic acceleration clause is barred by the “ipso facto” provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and is invalid in any case. See In re Crystal Properties, Ltd., L.P., 268 F.3d 743 (9th Cir. 2001). In other words, the court read a very bad bargain into the terms of the notes.
If the court’s holding were to become the rule, it would give rise to difficulties in determining the present value of corporate bonds and disrupt the corporate bond market. In fact, in this case the market priced the bonds significantly higher before the commencement of the case, and bondholders would have been better off selling out. This underscores the fact that the court’s ruling sharply reduced the real value of the notes.
It is unclear what impact this opinion will have, and investment banking counsel should take steps to reduce the risk of a similar result for their clients. Specifically, this result might be avoided by specifying that the prepayment premiums apply notwithstanding acceleration of the maturity date. In fact, the court commented that: “Contractual acceleration provisions are only limited in what they can do by the parties’ imaginations – in the absence of fraudulent, exploitative, overreaching, or unconscionable conduct.” Alternatively, lenders that are likely to be significantly oversecured should consider whether automatic acceleration upon bankruptcy confers any real advantage.
(Also seen on Insight Into Banking)
In 2002, Premier Entertainment Biloxi, LLC and certain related entities undertook to construct the Hard Rock Hotel & Casino Biloxi, the plans for which included a 112-foot guitar sign. To finance construction, the Debtors issued 10.75% first mortgage notes in the principal amount of $160 Million, due on February 1, 2012, with $8.6 Million in interest due February 1 and August 1 each year beginning on August 1, 2004. U.S. Bank served as indenture trustee.
The notes provided for automatic acceleration of the maturity date upon the Debtors’ filing of a voluntary bankruptcy petition. The notes also provided that the Debtors could redeem the notes prior to maturity, but not before the end of the “no-call period” on February 1, 2008, by paying the principal plus a prepayment premium (100% to 105.375% depending on the remaining term). If the Debtors were to take any willful action during the no-call period with the intent of avoiding the prohibition on early redemption, the lenders would be entitled to higher prepayment premiums (106.719% to 110.75% depending on the remaining term).
The hotel and casino were completed on time and a certificate of occupancy as issued on August 26, 2005. Three days later, on August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina completely destroyed the resort’s casino, which was built upon two floating barges, and severely damaged other facilities. Thereafter, the Debtors negotiated with the indenture trustee and other parties to reconstruct the resort, this time on concrete piers, using remaining cash and insurance proceeds. However, the lenders eventually lost faith in the project and stopped all construction disbursements.
On January 6, 2006, the indenture trustee gave notice of certain defaults, which did not trigger automatic acceleration. Subsequently, a controlling stake in the Debtors was purchased by a new equity group, which made several offers to purchase the notes up to 101% of principal, far below the 105.375% required as of the expiration of the no-call period. At the time, the market price of the notes ranged from 105% to 106%.
The indenture trustee rejected the offers, and the Debtors commenced chapter 11 cases on September 19, 2006. The Debtors filed a reorganization plan providing for payment of the notes at par value plus accrued interest from new financing. Although the noteholders rejected the plan, all other classes of creditors voted in favor of the plan and it was “crammed down” over the noteholders’ objections. The plan was confirmed in June, 2007, and the resort opened to much fanfare just a few days later.
Thereafter, a trial was held on the noteholders’ entitlement to the contractual prepayment premiums that were denied under the plan. The bankruptcy court ruled in favor of the Debtors, holding that: “The reason [automatic acceleration] clauses exist is to allow lenders to accelerate the debt without first having to petition the bankruptcy court to lift the automatic stay.” In exchange for this advantage, the court held that the noteholders gave up their expectation of a prepayment premium: “The [noteholders] chose to forego any prepayment premium in favor of an immediate right to collect their entire debt after a bankruptcy event of default.”
The court’s rationale is dubious in that it is unlikely the noteholders actually preferred to exchange the significant economic benefits of the prepayment premium for the relatively minor procedural advantage of avoiding a motion for relief from the automatic stay. Moreover, there is authority questioning whether an automatic acceleration clause is barred by the “ipso facto” provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and is invalid in any case. See In re Crystal Properties, Ltd., L.P., 268 F.3d 743 (9th Cir. 2001). In other words, the court read a very bad bargain into the terms of the notes.
If the court’s holding were to become the rule, it would give rise to difficulties in determining the present value of corporate bonds and disrupt the corporate bond market. In fact, in this case the market priced the bonds significantly higher before the commencement of the case, and bondholders would have been better off selling out. This underscores the fact that the court’s ruling sharply reduced the real value of the notes.
It is unclear what impact this opinion will have, and investment banking counsel should take steps to reduce the risk of a similar result for their clients. Specifically, this result might be avoided by specifying that the prepayment premiums apply notwithstanding acceleration of the maturity date. In fact, the court commented that: “Contractual acceleration provisions are only limited in what they can do by the parties’ imaginations – in the absence of fraudulent, exploitative, overreaching, or unconscionable conduct.” Alternatively, lenders that are likely to be significantly oversecured should consider whether automatic acceleration upon bankruptcy confers any real advantage.
(Also seen on Insight Into Banking)
Barrister's Club Crystal Ball (March 26, 2011)
Your are cordially invited to the Barrister’s Club Crystal Ball, which is a charity fundraiser benefitting the San Francisco Bar Association’s youth, diversity and school-to-college programs. This semi-formal event will take place at the San Francisco War Memorial’s Green Room (401 Van Ness Avenue at McAllister Street) on Saturday, March 26, 2011, at 7:00 pm. All are welcome to mingle and dance with our local attorneys, bid at the silent auction, and enjoy drinks and gourmet snacks. The price per ticket is $75, and you can register here. We would love to see you there! - Reno Fernandez
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